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I. INTRODUCTION
On the night of August 4 1789, the French Assemblée Constituante voted
unanimously to abolish feudalism. In this paper I discuss some intensely interac-
tive aspects of this process of collective decision-making and of the events that led
up to it. I shall proceed as follows. In Section II I discuss the idea of social inter-
action. Section III offers a brief and selective overview of the period between the
elections to the Estates-General in the spring of 1789 and the adoption of the final
version of the decrees on August 11. The following Sections consider a number of
interactive arenas, arranged in ever-smaller concentric circles. In Section IV I dis-
cuss the interactions between the Assembly and France as a whole, with emphasis
on the provinces outside Paris. In Section V the focus is on the interactions
between the assembly in Versailles and the city of Paris. In Section VI I consider
the interactions between the members of the assembly and the audience in the gal-
leries. In Section VII, which takes up about a third of the paper, I address the
modalities of interaction among the deputies themselves. Section VIII concludes
by a discussion of the role of interactive emotions in collective decision-making.
II. VARIETIES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION
The pre-analytical idea of social interaction is so vast and diffuse that it might
seem useless for analysis. I shall nevertheless try to put it some use it by contrast-
ing it with a series of antonyms. The antonym selection is guided by the account I
propose of social interaction in later Sections. Examples are also chosen so as to
provide background for these later discussions.
Interaction versus submission to authority. To simplify, assume that the lives
of social agents are constrained by three parameters: prices, earnings and laws.
These may either emerge from interaction among the agents or be imposed by a
superior authority. In the economic realm, this distinction is exemplified in the
contrast between markets and planning. In the political realm, an example is the
contrast between democracy and absolutism.
The distinction is not always very robust. In the history of French absolutism,
for instance, only Louis XIV approached the ideal of unconstrained power (but
* I thank Michael Macy, Pascale Pasquino, Charles Tilly and Michel Troper for comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
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see Bluche 1986, pp. 192-196). His predecessor had to cope both with the nobil-
ity and the partly juridical, partly political bodies of parlements. While his two
successors could largely ignore the former, they still had to deal with the latter. A
paradigmatic sequence is the following (Olivier-Martin 1997). First, the King
issues a law that has to be registered by the parlements. Second, the parlements
offer remonstrances or objections to the law. Third, the King uses his right to
impose the law in a «lit de justice». Fourth, the parlements refuse to apply the law.
Fifth, the King sends the magistrates into forced exile to a remote part of the coun-
try and tries to replace them by another set of officials. Sixth, when the exiled
magistrates successfully deter anyone from taking office in the new institutions,
justice comes to a standstill and the King has to recall the parlements and give in
to some of their objections. When Louis XVI tried to impose his will on the Con-
stituent Assembly in the «séance royale» (related to a «lit de justice») on June 23
1789, the third estate refused to obey his orders to disperse because they could
draw on this precedent (Dumont 1832, p. 67). In such cases, the final outcome
emerges from vertical interaction between the less-than-absolute ruler and other
instances, as well as from horizontal interaction within the latter.
Interaction versus isolation. Interaction presupposes causal relations among
the interacting individuals. When they are causally isolated, they cannot interact.
Secret voting is a paradigm of causal isolation, which does not exclude that even
when an individual’s vote cannot have a causal impact on the voting on others he
may act as if he believes, magically, that it can (Quattrone and Tversky 1986).
Public voting, too, may be nearer to causal isolation than to interaction if care is
taken to make individuals cast their votes as close to simultaneously as possible.
In a work written to shape the procedures of the Estates-General in France, Ben-
tham (1999, pp. 106-109) insisted on simultaneity of votes to «lessen the efficacy
of undue influence»1. In writing that book, he made a study of earlier French polit-
ical assemblies in which each member cast his vote immediately after making his
speech, and before having an occasion to listen to the speeches of other members
who might, in theory, change his mind (ibid., pp. 94-101). Bentham argued that in
this system causal interaction operates where it should not (by allowing the vote
cast by one individual to affect that of another) and operates only partially where
it should (by allowing the opinions expressed by one individual to affect that of
another)2. As a result, «the chance a man has of forming a right opinion is exactly
in the inverse ratio of the chance he has of gaining partisans to that opinion» (ibid.,
p. 95).
In the same work Bentham (1999, pp. 132-133), or rather his French collabo-
rators, argued for the British practice of excluding written speeches in parlia-
ment3. «The principal advantage of a national senate, and from public discussion,
1 Proof sheets of this work were read and quoted, without attribution, by Mirabeau (Courrier de
Provence No.10). On the influence on Bentham and Mirabeau on the actual procedures adopted by the
Constituent Assembly, see Castaldo (1989), pp. 84-99.
2 We may note that Rousseau (1964, p. 371) regarded even the latter form of interaction as unde-
sirable. The general will emerges if and only if the voters are prevented from communicating among
themselves. Interaction creates faction, intrigue and distortion of the general will.
3 This section was not written by Bentham, but taken from the Courrier de Provence LXV.
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arises from that activity of mind, from that abundance of resources, which results
from a large assembly of enlightened men who animate and excite each other».
This give and take is impossible when deputies content themselves with reading
prepared speeches, as was the usual practice in the Constituent Assembly (Aulard
1882; Furet and Halévi 1996, pp. 130-140). The resulting dialogue of the deaf is
obviously not to be confused with genuinely interactive discussion. Mme de Staël
(2000, p. 179), perhaps echoing Bentham, also points to another advantage of the
ban on written manuscripts: only people who really know the subject matter are
capable of improvising.
The Constituent Assembly used two methods for voting. One, «vote par assis
et levé», was the normal procedure. The president asked those who were in favor
of a motion to stand up and others to remain seated. If he was uncertain about the
majority or if a deputy expressed a doubt, one proceeded to a «vote nominal», i.e.
a roll-call vote (Castaldo 1989, pp. 346-353). Because roll-calls make it possible
for the vote of one deputy to have a causal influence on that of another, they can
induce path-dependence. If deputies vote in alphabetical order and a particularly
influential deputy is near the beginning of the alphabet, the outcome may differ
from what it would have been if they had voted in inverse alphabetical order. Roll-
call votes also create a potential for interaction with the audience. In the Con-
stituent Assembly, it was easier for the audience to identify who voted for or
against a proposal if the voting was by roll-call rather than by standing and sit-
ting4. I shall return to the strategic implications of this fact.
The relation between an assembly and the public can also be one of interaction
or of isolation. As shown by the Federal Convention in Philadelphia, isolation can
be achieved if two conditions are satisfied. First, no audience is allowed. Second,
members take an oath to secrecy and respect it. In the Constituent Assembly, pro-
posals were made to isolate the assembly along these lines. On May 29, Malouet
proposed to exclude «foreigners» from the deliberations of the third estate
(Creuzé-Latouche 1946, p. 25), to which Volney responded in the characteristic
radical cant of the time that «all citizens are not only our brothers, but our mas-
ters» (ibid.). In his botched declaration of June 23 (see below), Louis XVI also
demanded that in the future nobody but the deputies should be present at their pro-
ceedings. In April 1789 a certain Albisson wrote an otherwise insightful memo-
randum to the King’s minister in which he proposed that the deputies be sworn not
to reveal anything about what passed in the assembly (Kessel 1969, p. 84). As it
was known at the time that the number of deputies would exceed one thousand,
the proposal was hardly realistic5. (At the Federal Convention, there were fifty-
five delegates.)
4 Since actions such as standing up or raising one’s hand have to be identified by the vote coun-
ters they can also be identified by third parties. Thucydides (6.24) states, for instance, that «with the
enthusiasm of the majority [for the Sicilian expedition], the few that liked it not, feared to appear unpa-
triotic by holding up their hands against it». Yet not only in Paris in 1789, but also in the Frankfurt con-
stituent assembly of 1848 (Eyck 1968, p. 157), deputies felt more visible and vulnerable in roll-call
votes.
5 In the six weeks when the three orders met separately, the nobility and (with occasional excep-
tions) the clergy deliberated only behind closed doors. Just before the King ordered them to join the
third estate, they had decided to admit the public (Lefebvre and Terroine 1953, p. 25).
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Interaction versus common cause. When A and B interact, one of them has a
causal impact on the other (and perhaps, but not necessarily, vice versa). A differ-
ent causal structure arises when A and B are both affected by a third factor C, with-
out directly affecting one another. Similarity of behavior, for instance, may be due
to pressures of conformism (Tocqueville 1969, p. 643) or to the fact that the indi-
viduals live under similar conditions (ibid., pp. 640-641). In the Constituent
Assembly, the votes for president of the body were secret. There were no candi-
dates: a member could cast his vote for any other member. Since votes were usu-
ally not scattered among many but concentrated among a few, coordinating agen-
cies must have been at work. In the vote cast on August 1 1789, for instance, 406
deputies voted for the moderate Thouret and 402 for the radical Sieyes. (For rea-
sons discussed below, Thouret withdrew from the post.) Although such coordina-
tion is itself a form of social interaction, it is not interaction among the voting
deputies themselves but orchestration of their votes from outside.
In the spring and summer of 1789, rural France saw a number of local acts of
protesting authority, defined by John Markoff (1996, p. 205) as «an instance of
twenty or more people of the countryside, acting publicly and as a group, directly
engaged in seizing or damaging the resources of another party, or defending them-
selves against another party’s claim upon them.» Markoff (ibid., p. 273) enumer-
ates various causes that have been cited to account for these events: high or
increasing prices of food, changes in consciousness, the erosion of traditional
relationships, the dynamism of the market economy, and the organizational capac-
ities of the peasantry. In his view, «There may be something to one or some or all
of these theses. But what none of them, in themselves, can explain, is the sharp
oscillatory pattern» of the insurrections. If the local events all proceeded from a
common cause that was more or less constant over the period, we would not
expect the number of conflicts to «oscillate wildly from one month to the next»
(ibid, p. 271). In his opinion, the «fundamental reason for this pattern is the quin-
tessentially interactive nature of social conflict» (ibid.). Rather than reacting
blindly and viscerally to hardship, the peasantry had a «sense of the risks and ben-
efits associated with alternative courses of action» (ibid., p. 272). Beliefs about
these variables were constantly updated in the light of successes and failures of
nearby insurrections, creating a potential for chain reactions similar to those
observed in Eastern Europe exactly two hundred years later.
Interaction versus comparison. The statement «A exploits B» refers to an
interaction between these two agents. It may go together with interaction-based
emotions, such as anger or resentment. The statement «A has more money than B»
expresses a comparison between them, and can be made even when A or B have
never met or heard about each other. Suppose, however, that both A and B know
that A is richer than B. In that case, the difference may give rise to the compari-
son-based emotion of envy. As a result of the action tendency associated with the
emotion, we may also observe comparison-based interaction, if B takes steps to
destroy the envied object or its possessor (Elster 1999, Ch.III). In the Ancien
régime, Tocqueville argued that the interaction-based hatred of the peasantry
towards the lords and the comparison-based envy of the bourgeoisie towards the
nobility were among the main causal forces behind the Revolution (ibid.).
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The ancien régime was obsessed with status (Mousnier 1996). The nobility
enjoyed humiliating the bourgeoisie, which burned with resentment at the way
they were treated. In his account of the breakdown of negotiations among the
three orders in May-June 1789, Timothy Tackett (1996, p. 144) writes that «For a
large number of deputies, a deep-seated revulsion for the years of condescension
and scorn was released by the current configuration. The struggle for status – the
desire – in Abbé Sieyes’s phrase – to be recognized as “something” in the social
order, became an all-consuming passion, pushing them toward a break». Among
the reforms of August 4 1789, the passion found both positive and negative out-
lets. On the one hand, the assembly established equal access for all to civil and
military office was. On the other hand, they abolished the honorific distinctions of
the nobility, such as hunting rights and the right to bear pigeons. The abolition of
the purely symbolic rights to coats-of-arms or liveried servants came in June
1790.
III. THE MAIN STEPS TO AUGUST 13 1789
To facilitate the understanding of the events discussed in subsequent sections,
I provide a brief and selective recapitulation of the main events leading up to the
decrees of August.
Elections to the Estates-General. The composition of the Estates-General
owed a great deal to the mode of election. For my purposes, the most important
feature is perhaps that as a result of the rules for electing representatives of the
clergy, almost three quarters among them were parish priests, who were in many
respects closer to the third estate than to the high clergy. Another was the rule
allowing an estate to choose deputies from outside itself. The third estate had orig-
inally opposed this option, fearing that habits of deference would allow the privi-
leged estates to impose themselves. Yet in a decision of December 27 1788, the
King explicitly refused to block this option, which allowed the third estate to elect
Mirabeau and Sieyes – the two outstanding members of the assembly. Ironically,
this rule compensated for another that have made Mirabeau ineligible as a deputy
for the nobility because he did not possess a fief.
Verification of credentials. After the deputies met in Versailles in May 5 1789,
the next six weeks were spent in debating how to verify their credentials. The third
estate wanted the verification to be made in common by all three estates, without
prejudging the question whether the subsequent votes should take place by order
or by head. The nobility and the upper clergy thought that common verification
would set a precedent for voting by head, which they opposed. This prolonged
period of sparring and treading water had two important effects. It allowed the
deputies of the third estate to get to know each other and acquire a self-confidence
they might not otherwise have achieved (Dumont 1832, p. 31; but see Tocqueville
1953, p. 177). Moreover, in the countryside the inaction of the assembly was
widely interpreted as an attempt by the upper classes to wreck the reforms sig-
naled by the convocation of the Estates-General (Lefebvre 1988, p. 81). On June
17, the third estate declared itself to be the National Assembly and invited mem-
bers of the other estates to join them.
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Two counterrevolutions. Under the influence of the Court and against
the advice of his minister Necker, Louis XVI decided to impose his will on the
assembly. In a «séance royale» on June 23 he canceled the decision of June 17 as
unconstitutional. Although he allowed for common deliberations if each order
assented to it, he excluded this option for a number of vital constitutional issues.
He proposed a program of moderate reform, and threatened to dissolve the assem-
bly if they opposed him. He ended by ordering the deputies to leave the hall in
which they were assembled. The nobility and most of the clergy obeyed, but the
third estate and some thirty parish priests remained. The next day they were joined
by most of the remaining clergy and by 47 liberal nobles. Following popular reac-
tions in Versailles and Paris and indications that the troops might not obey orders
to shoot on the crowd, the King capitulated on June 27 by ordering the three
estates to meet and deliberate in common.
The days before his capitulation, the King had began to order supposedly reli-
able troops to march on Paris. Over the next few days, more marching orders were
given. The troop movements were part of a counterrevolutionary plan inspired by
a circle of nobles around Marie-Antoinette. Although little is known about the
plan and the extent to which the King was informed about it (Caron 1906-7), it
must minimally have aimed at imposing the declaration of June 23 and replacing
Necker. When the concentration of troops became known, Mirabeau made a
strong speech in the assembly on July 8, warning the king that the troops might
side with their fellow citizens and that, moreover, their presence might induce the
very crowd uprisings they were supposed to prevent. Perhaps as a result of this
speech, the implementation of the plan was speeded up before all the troops had
arrived from the provinces. Instead of Necker being dismissed on July 15, as had
been planned, he was told to leave on July 11. The next day his dismissal was
known in Paris, and on the following days angry crowds invaded the Invalides to
get guns and stormed the Bastille to get gunpowder. The conspirators showed
themselves monumentally inept. The King, once again, capitulated. On July 15,
he announced the departure of the troops and on July 16 the recall of Necker. In
the first wave of «émigrés», most prominent members of the counterrevolutionary
conspiracy left the country.
Two immediate precursors. The decisions taken on the night of August 4 had
two proximate triggers or antecedents. One was the debate in the assembly on the
Declaration of the rights of man. Various draft declarations were offered at the end
of July, and in the morning of August 4 the assembly decided to go ahead with the
project. Several writers have seen a causal connection between the decision of the
morning and the decrees adopted in the night. The Courrier de Provence (XXIII,
pp. 8-9), Mirabeau’s journal, argued that the decrees were engineered by the
nobility to divert attention from the project of a declaration to which they were
opposed. Rivarol (1824, pp. 138-19) asserts that to satisfy the people, «that impe-
rious master», it was necessary to descend from abstract theories and principles to
concrete applications. Still others (Buchet and Roux, p. 243) assert that since it
was clear that any declaration of rights would entail the abolition of privilege, «it
was wise to appear to desire what one would in any case have been forced to
accept a few days later». None of these claims seems compellingly plausible.
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In any event, a second precursor was vastly more important. During the month
of July, a wave of insurrection and destruction swept through the French country-
side. As mentioned above and more fully discussed below, many peasant commu-
nities believed that the nobles were deliberately sabotaging the reform work of the
assembly. They responded by attacking castles, burning property records, taking
redistributive measures and the like (Markoff 1996, pp. 261-262). Personal vio-
lence against the lords, which may or may not have resulted in their death,
occurred in 3% of anti-seigniorial events, as against 53% that involved property
damage (ibid., p. 221). Although small in relative terms, the number and grue-
some detail of the massacres was large enough to focus the attention of contem-
poraries (Ferrières 1880, pp. 120-121). The nobles at Versailles, obviously, were
not at immediate personal risk, but their properties (and perhaps their relatives)
were. The first reaction of the assembly, on the evening of August 3, was to pro-
pose repressive measures. After debate, the proposal was sent to a committee,
which reported back in equally repressive terms the next evening. After the report
had been read, the first speaker, the Vicomte de Noailles, argued that the peasantry
had to be met with concessions, not with repression. His speech was the first event
in «the night of August 4».
IV. INTERACTION BETWEEN VERSAILLES
AND THE PROVINCES
The cahiers de doléance. The French provinces provided a basis for the pro-
ceedings in Versailles through the «cahiers de doléance» («grievance books»)
drawn up by local electoral assemblies of the three orders. Some cahiers contained
instructions (imperative mandates) to the deputies about how to vote on specific
issues (Castaldo 1989, pp. 142-46; Hyslop 1967, pp. 99-104; Cadart 1952, Ch.7).
On June 27 the King declared that the mandates were null and void6, and on July
8 the assembly confirmed the decision. The cahiers nevertheless remained
causally influential. Thus on July 27 Clermont-Tonnerre presented a summary of
the cahiers as the basis for the work of the constitutional committee. The summary
makes no reference to the issues debated on the Night of August 4. If anything, by
insisting that property is sacred it anticipates the main obstacle to the implemen-
tation of the decrees passed on that occasion. If the summary does not mention
feudalism and its abolition, it was probably due to a narrow interpretation of the
mandate of the committee. As Markoff (1996) shows, the decrees of August 4 cor-
responds closely to demands expressed in the cahiers.
A discrepancy arises if we go to the final version adopted on August 11. On
August 4, the assembly merely demanded the possibility for the peasants of abol-
ishing the tithe with compensation. Even this went beyond the majority of the
6 In the King’s convocation of the Estates-General on January 24 several formulations indicate
that he wanted to ban imperative mandates, but the electoral assemblies ignored them (Castaldo 1989,
p. 143). His reason for prohibiting mandates was not the one made famous by Burke and Sieyes, viz.
to allow free deliberation among the deputies, but his desire to make them more pliable to his wishes
(Cadart 1952, p. 159).
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cahiers (Markoff 1996, pp. 109-110). On August 11, the assembly abolished the
tithe without compensation, ordering that the ends for which it had been used
(supporting the priests, poor relief, maintenance of churches) would be ensured by
other means. In the process that brought about this radical shift, Buzot cleverly
used an argument from the cahiers of the clergy to show that the tithe was not a
property that should be indemnified. Defending the revolutionary principle that
«the ecclesiastical properties belong to the nation», he cited several clerical
cahiers that demanded the Estates-General to increase the salary («portion con-
grue») paid to priests who were not tithe-holders. In doing so, the clergy «recog-
nized the incontestable rights of the nation over church property. They would not
have made this proposal to those with no right to share goods that do not belong
to them» (AP 8, p. 354). If the rhetorical trick of using the cahiers of the clergy
against themselves (Kessel 1969, p. 200) disarmed opposition to radical mea-
sures, it would show at least an indirect influence of these documents. To my
knowledge, there is little evidence of a direct causal link. Rather, the cahiers and
the decrees had a common cause, viz. the general spirit of reform that had been
developing over the previous decades.
Thwarted anticipations. This being said, the very act of calling the Estates-
General and requesting cahiers to be drawn up had an indubitable causal influence
on the decrees of August 4. Lefebvre (1988, pp. 62-63) cites many contemporary
statements to the effect that the mere convo cation of the Estates and the drawing
up of the cahiers implied that tithes and seigniorial rights would be abolished or
already had been abolished. «For the peasantry, their grievances were justified by
the right to express them» (Kessel 1969, p. 78). While the dearth of grain had
caused peasant uprisings throughout France in the spring of 1789, «there was a
brief lull at end of May and in June, as people were expecting some relief from the
Estates-General» (Lefebvre 1988, p. 49). When relief failed to come, the move-
ments started up again. In Versailles, the failure of the Estates-General to begin its
reform work was perceived as deliberate sabotage by the clergy and nobility.
Deputies of the third estate kept their local constituencies informed, directly in the
towns (ibid, pp. 91-93) and indirectly in the countryside (ibid, p. 94). The cause of
the increased rhythm of peasant unrest was not simply the failure of relief, nor the
frustration of expectations of relief, but the belief that there was a malign intention
behind the frustration. In the revolutionary years, the right no less than the left
constantly appealed to conspiracy theories (Lefebvre 1988, p. 98 and passim;
Tackett 1996, pp. 244-247). As we just saw, these were not always groundless.
When news of Necker’s dismissal reached the provinces, the conspiracy the-
ory was strongly reinforced. Lefebvre (1988, p. 103 ff.) insist on the fact that the
strong reactions were triggered by the news of what happened in Paris on July 11,
not by the news from July 14-16. The provincial defense of the revolution devel-
oped independently of the actions taken by the people in Paris. As a corollary, he
also insists on the spontaneous character of the local movements. As proof their
centralized origin, many have cited a letter dated July 15 from Barnave to his
friends in Grenoble to the effect that «I count on the energy of your town, on
which it is now incumbent to take the lead. The same movement will exist in all
the provinces; it is coordinated («concerté») from here.» Yet in many places local
resistance was organized before these instructions could possibly have been
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received. Early (false) rumors and later (correct) reports that prominent nobles
had emigrated fueled the theory of an «aristocratic conspiracy». Seen through the
lenses of this theory, many innocuous or ordinary events in the countryside
appeared to confirm it, as Lefebvre (1988) shows brilliantly through many exam-
ples. In the second half of July, peasant insurrections flamed up again. «It is in
its accentuated anti-seigniorial aspect, under the clear influence of the aristocratic
conspiracy and the uprising in Paris, that the July movement differs from the
spring riots. [...] Yet the assembly had not yet began discussing the tithe and the
feudal dues, and the bourgeoisie had never talked about suppressing them by
force, let alone without compensation. The peasantry took matters into their own
hands» (Lefebvre 1988, p. 124).
Feedback to Paris. In 1789, news from Paris took two days to reach Lyon and
four days to reach Marseilles; smaller towns were even more slowly informed
(ibid., pp. 89-91)7. Given the greater capacities of Paris, it took presumably even
longer for news from the provinces to reach Paris and Versailles. Taking account
of the time lag and the time pattern of insurrections and destructions, Markoff
(1996, p. 437) calculates that the reception of bad news from the provinces had
two sharp spikes around July 28 and August 2. It took the deputies a few days to
absorb the shock and start taking countermeasures. As noted earlier, their initial
reaction was to insist on law and order. With 24 hours for reflection, they decided
instead to calm the peasantry by offering concessions. This statement, while part
of the conventional wisdom, says both too much and too little. As initially envis-
aged, the concessions may have been more apparent than real. Also, as we shall
see, fear of violence and destruction was not the only motive that animated the
constituants.
Markoff (1996, p. 264) summarizes the interaction by saying that «local peas-
ant actions were part of a dialogue with the legislature». The term «dialogue» is
perhaps too strong. It was a process of action and reaction (to action and to inac-
tion) rather than a joint deliberative process.
V. INTERACTION BETWEEN VERSAILLES AND PARIS
Why isolation is desirable. Two principles regulate the location of a con-
stituent assembly. First, it should not meet in or near a capital city, unless it can
insulate itself by enforcing total secrecy of the proceedings. If the assembly has
neither physical nor (as the Federal Convention in Philadelphia) communicational
isolation from city crowds with strong radical demands, its deliberations will not
be fully free. Second, it should not meet in the vicinity of large troop concentra-
tions. The events leading up to July 14 underline the importance of the second
principle. As Sieyes reminded the Assembly on July 8, the provincial estates in
Brittany did not deliberate if there were troops within 40 km. The assembly had
not forgotten the lessons from July (and from similar events in October) when it
7 The speed of this organized diffusion of news was thus about ten kilometers per hour. By com-
parison, the speed of propagation of the Great Fear was about four kilometers per hour in daytime
(Lefebvfre 1986, p. 178).
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laid down, in the constitution of September 3 1791, that «The executive power
[i.e. the King] cannot cause any body of troops to pass or sojourn within thirty
thousand toises [60 km] of the legislative body, except upon its requisition or its
authorization.»
Prior to the calling of the Estates-General, the first principle was only dimly
understood. In 1788, there were several options on the table: Paris, Versailles at 13
km from Paris, or a more distant town such as Soissons at 100 km or Compiègne
at 80 km (Kessel 1969, pp. 74-76; Egret 1975, pp. 249-250). In the choice among
these options, the Queen and the Garde des Sceaux (Minister of Justice), Barentin,
preferred the more distant locations because they feared the influence of the
Parisian agitators on the deliberations of the assembly. Necker preferred Paris,
because he thought the proximity to the capital market in Paris would have a mod-
erating influence on the assembly. The King decided in favor of Versailles because
he did not want interference with his hunting habits. After July 14, however, it
became impossible to ignore the dangerous presence of Paris. In September, an ill-
assorted deputation of moderates and royalists, with the approval of Necker and
the Foreign Minister, Montmorin, proposed the transferal of the assembly to Com-
piègne or Soissons. The moderates wanted to remove the assembly from the threat
of popular interference, and the royalists to remove the protection against military
threats that Paris had just shown it could offer (Mathiez 1898, p. 272). When the
ministers put the proposal to the King, he refused. He was sleepy after hunting and
slept through most of the council.
Modes of interaction. There were several mechanisms by which radical ele-
ments in Paris could shape decisions in the assembly8. At later stages in the Rev-
olution, the organized influence of the Clubs became preponderant (Jaume 1989,
p.  51-52). In the earlier phases that concern me here, a simpler mechanism was
the most important. Members of the audience would note who voted against radi-
cal proposals and circulate lists with their names in Paris, playing on the fear of
the delegates that they or their families might be persecuted9. Thus when the third
estate voted on June 17 whether to constitute itself as National Assembly, ninety
deputies cast negative votes. Lists with their names were circulated in Paris,
where they were denounced as traitors (Egret 1950, p. 72). One of those who
voted against was Thouret. When he was elected president of the assembly on
August 1, the most commonly cited explanation of why he stepped down is that
because of his vote on June 17 he was unacceptable to the radical elements in
Paris, who issued death threats against him (e.g. Droz 1860, vol.II, p. 302; Furet
and Halévi 1996, p. 154). His biographer claims that he refused to take office
because his small superiority of votes over Sieyes showed him that he had been
elected with the support of the nobility and upper clergy, whose patronage was
unacceptable to him (Lebèque 1910, p. 145). The Comte de Ferrières (1880,
p. 120) states in his Mémoires that the «agents of revolution [...] feared that
[Thouret] would refuse to lend himself to what one planned to do against the
8 I shall not discuss mechanisms of interaction within the Parisian crowds themselves. On this
topic, see the brilliant study by Lefebvre (1988, pp. 243-264) as well as Rudé (1959).
9 In addition, they could circulate the list to the deputy’s constituency (Duquesnoy 1894 I,
p. 104; Egret 1950 p. 132).
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nobility and the clergy», and thus spread rumors that he had sold himself to the
reaction. Thouret then resigned because he wanted to avoid «violent movements
and horrible divisions» (ibid., p. 122) in the assembly rather than out of personal
fear.
When Thouret stepped down, the assembly elected the Breton deputy Le
Chapelier as president. From the point of view of the Breton Club of deputies,
who orchestrated the events of August 4, he was the ideal person to preside over
the debates. He did not respond to demands that the assembly respect its own
rules, which were designed to avoid haste and precipitation (Kessel 1969 p. 200;
Courrier de Provence XXIV p. 11). If Thouret had been president, he would cer-
tainly have tried to slow things down. As a Normand, he was notoriously slow and
cautious (Walter 1989, p. 109). On May 16 1791, for instance, he tried in vain to
prevent an assembly that was «drunk with disinterestedness» (Lebèque 1910,
p. 261) from adopting Robespierre’s proposal that its members would be ineligi-
ble to the first ordinary legislature. By getting him out of the way and replacing
him with one of their own, the organizers of the night of August 4 greatly facili-
tated their task.
VI. INTERACTION BETWEEN DEPUTIES AND AUDIENCE
There are two forms of deputy-audience interaction. One is triadic, and relies
on the ability of the audience to communicate salient debates and votes to Paris.
This mechanism has already been discussed above, but I shall add some details and
examples here. The examples are ambiguous, since one cannot exclude that the
communication to radical circles in Paris is made by radical deputies rather than by
radical members of the audience. The other is unambiguously dyadic, and relies
only on the effects on the speakers of an approving or disapproving audience.
Triadic interactions. The combination of optional voting by roll-call and the
presence of an audience who can write down the names of deputies who vote
against popular measures yield an obvious potential for strategic behavior. If an
anti-popular measure seems to have a majority, the minority can demand and usu-
ally obtain roll-call voting. According to Mounier (1989, p. 911), many who on
June 16 supported his opinion against the third estate declaring itself the National
Assembly changed their mind the next day when a roll-call vote was taken.
According to another moderate, Lally-Tolendal (1790, p. 121), «a man who had
not been afraid to stand up when surrounded by all his neighbors, does not dare to
vote his opinion if called by name, when he sees lists being made that at the end
of the session will circulate in the capital and the provinces». With regard to the
vote defeating the anti-popular measure of bicameralism, he writes that «Mem-
bers of the third estate have told me: I do not want my wife and children to have
their throats cut» (ibid, p. 141). In some cases, votes were taken twice with oppo-
site outcomes. The first vote on the royal veto, by standing and sitting, which gave
a majority for an absolute veto, was reversed when the minority demanded a roll-
10 It is also relevant to note that moderates did much better in the secret elections of the president
of the assembly than in open policy votes (Droz 1860, p. 337 n.1). This pattern is also well-known
from elections of trade union leaders.
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call vote (Kessel 1969, pp. 254-55). The decision to elaborate a declaration of
rights and duties, rather than a simple declaration of rights, was reversed in the
same way (ibid, p. 355 n.405), as was the fatal decision to shift the locus of the
assembly from committees to plenary sessions (ibid., p. 120). As the examples
indicate, the strategy seems to have been very common (ibid., p. 216-217;
Castaldo 1989, p. 352)10.
As we know that many of those present on the night of August 4 disapproved of
the decrees, the unanimity of the vote must have been spurious. «One reason [...]
seems to have been a concern not to be noticed by the patriots [radicals] or by the
journalists who were present at the session» (Kessel 1969, p. 189). Another reason
is that some deputies were strategically absent. Mirabeau, in particular, stayed
away because he anticipated the way the evening would go and did not wish to
imperil his popularity by pointless resistance (ibid., p. 134)11. Some members of the
upper clergy left in the hope that the discussion of the tithe would be postponed and
that the assembly would think differently the next day, but the maneuver backfired
since the parish priests took the occasion to frustrate their superiors (ibid., p. 156).
The unanimity with which the clergy gave up the tithe without compensation
a few days later was even more spurious and forced (Tocqueville 1953, p. 216).
Duquesnoy (1894, p. 284) writes in his journal for August 11 that «Yesterday, the
clergy was decisively opposed; the whole day was spent in vain and tumultuous
debate, but today, without any apparent motive, the priests hurry go give up the
tithe; they almost stamped with infamy those who might have tried to oppose it,
but the decree was unanimous. If one could penetrate into the secret causes of this
change, I think it would have been found that it must be attributed to the fear one
has made some of them feel for the violence of Paris.» An external observer, Abbé
Morellet offers additional details: «It is known that in the night from August 10 to
11, intrigues, promises and threats shaped the disposition of the small number of
priests who went to the bureau of the assembly give up their just rights, and that it
would have been dangerous for the others not to follow their example» (Kessel
1969, p. 220)12. In a letter to his constituency, an anonymous deputy cites an over-
11 He had already stayed away on June 17, to avoid being seen to vote against the transformation
of the third estate into the National Assembly (Dumont 1832, p. 59). This behavior is somewhat ironic
in light of his remarks in the debate on the quorum of the assembly: :While one can hope to influence
and convince individuals who are present, by the use of reasons, what influence can one have on those
who reply by not appearing?»(AP 8, p. 299). Although he did participate in the debates over the unpop-
ular absolute veto (which he favored), the obscurity of his speeches and his abstention from the roll-
call vote protected him from being put on the list of proponents of the measure that was circulated in
Paris (Dumont 1832, p. 109).
12 His testimony may be suspect: Morellet became counterrevolutionary when the revolution
deprived him of his ecclesiastical incomes (Lefebvre 1964, p. 151).
13 The parish priests, understandably, were «outraged that the Third Estate seemed to be reneging
on a promise made only a few weeks earlier – as part of their appeal for clerical support – never to touch
ecclesiastical property» (Tackett 1996, p. 180). One priest exclaimed, «When you begged us, in the
name of God, to join you, was it just to cut our throats», only to be met with derision (Lally-Tolendal
1790, p. 114). Nor did the clergy receive any support from the aristocracy, which kept silent throughout
the debate, in the hope that «this immediate satisfaction obtained at the expense of the clergy would
make the peasants less eager to pursue the abolition of feudal rights» (Jaurès 1968, p. 469). One might
ask whether a spillover effect is not just as plausible as this compensation effect (Elster 1999, pp. 23-
26), thus raising the question of interaction among issues rather than among persons.
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heard conversation during which a fellow deputy says that «since the clergy
refuses to sacrifice the right to be [indemnified for loss of the tithe], one would
have to take the vote by roll-call, since there were several people in the room who
would take down the names of those who voted against, and that one would
denounce them, in Paris and in the provinces, as enemies of the people who were
opposed to its relief» (ibid., p. 215-216)13.
Dyadic interactions. The direct effect – not mediated by anticipation of diffu-
sion of information to Paris – of the audience on the votes of the deputies is harder
to assess. In the hall where first the third estate and later the assembly as a whole
met in Versailles, there was room for between 1000 and 2000 visitors in addition
to the deputies. Until May 30, there were no barriers between deputies and audi-
ence and even later there were complaints of inappropriate mingling (Lefebvre
and Terroine 1953, p. 25). On July 16, the president of the assembly proposed that
deputies wear a distinctive mark so that they could recognize each other as well as
the strangers in their midst (Creuzé-Latouche 1946, p. 239). The idea was rejected
as undermining the principle of equality14. After July 24 the deputy benches were
organized in an amphitheater with a better separation between speakers and audi-
ence. Little seems to be known about the rules of admittance of the public and the
composition of the audience. We know more about both issues after the assembly
moved to Paris.
On June 3 Duquesnoy (1894, p. 66) notes that «It is difficult to know the true
spirit of the assembly, because the deliberations are mixed with a murmur of
approval or disapproval which comes from the galleries and has nothing in com-
mon with the opinion of the deputies.» It sounds as if he is complaining that the
presence of the audience makes it difficult for him to assess which way the wind
is blowing among the deputies. Observing the proceedings on June 15, Arthur
Young (1794, p. 125) writes with disapproval that «the spectators in the galleries
are allowed to interfere in the debates by clapping their, and by other noisy expres-
sions of approbation: this is grossly indecent; it is also dangerous; for, if they be
permitted to express approbation, they are, by parity of reason, allowed expres-
sions of dissent; and they may hiss as well as clap; which, it is said, they have
sometimes done: this would be, to over-rule the debate, and influence the deliber-
ation.» It is hard to tell exactly how much this noisy behavior mattered for the
debates and the votes (see Brasart 1988, pp. 69-78 and Castaldo 1989, p. 303-6 for
slightly different assessments). On the night of August 4, the audience may have
been smaller than in the early days of the Estates-General (Kessel 1969, pp. 133-
134). In any case, few writers claim that it had an important direct influence on the
decrees, although Rivarol (1824, pp. 145-46) states that the parish priests were
pushed over the brink by «the furious galleries».
14 Creuzé-Latouche (1946, p. 245-146) notes that the next day a deputy from the nobility reintro-
duced the idea of distinctive mark which would protect noble deputies who were in danger of being
attacked by the crowds in Paris where half of the noble deputies lived. In his opinion, this was also the
real motivation behind the earlier proposal. Duquesnoy (1894, p. 223) claims that the purpose of the
president’s initiative was to make the deputies recognized and respected by the people. Bentham (1999
pp. 51-52) cites further advantages of a distinctive dress.
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VII. INTERACTION AMONG THE DEPUTIES
Motives. To assess the nature and the importance of interaction among the
deputies we have to look at their motives. Let me offer some sample opinions of
contemporaries and later historians:
The Courrier de Provence, refers to «reciprocal challenge and combat in gen-
erosity» (No. XXIII) and to «the seduction of applause, the emulation of outdoing
one’s colleagues, the honor of personal disinterestedness, and to the kind of noble
intoxication which accompanies the effervescence of generosity» (No. XXIV).
Oelsner (a follower of Sieyes) classified the motives as follows: «Some were motivated
by the general utility, but many made a virtue of necessity. Some thought they would trap
their adversaries, others aspired to praise by newspapers or a group without concern for
the consequences; a third was swept up in the general intoxication; and a fourth tried to
spoil things by pushing them into extravagance» (Kessel 1969, p. 132).
According to Duquesnoy (1894, p. 285), the main motives were «fear and vengeance».15
Ferrières (1880, pp. 125, 126) refers to «faked enthusiasm» and to a «feeling of hatred, a
blind desire for vengeance».
The Abbé Chevallier, a deputy from Nantes, said that «one does not know what is most
astonishing, the audacious imposture of those who offer what is not theirs to give, or the
ineptitude of the deputies who, on their instigation, gave sincerely what they ought to
have kept» (Kessel 1969, p. 148)
Rivarol (1824, p. 141-142) says that «zeal competed with spite».
According to Droz (1860 vol.II, p. 308), there were «generous challenges and petty
vengeances».
For Tocqueville (1953, p. 214) «the night of August 4 was the combined result, in doses
that are impossible to determine, of fear and enthusiasm».
For Jaurès (1968, p. 455), there was «as much calculation as generosity».
Kessel (1969, pp. 189-90) finds that «of all the themes that emerge from an examination
of the opinion of the privileged orders, the one that dominates all others, is fear».
Fitzsimmons (1994, p. 53) writes that «Although calculation and jealousy may have
characterized some actions that evening, the sense of renewal and altruism was far
stronger».
According to Tackett (1996, pp. 173-4), «For a few brief moments, the curious combina-
tion of idealism, anxiety, and the feelings of fraternity had brought [the deputies] all
together.»
I agree with Tocqueville that the exact proportion of different motivations is
beyond what we can establish. I shall simply discuss four separate motives that
clearly played some role: fear, self-interest, enthusiasm, and spite. Of these, fear
15 When Fitzsimmons and Tackett cite Duquesnoy (1894, p. 267) in support of their benign inter-
pretation of the motives, they refer to an enthusiastic entry on August 5, not to the disillusioned entry
from August 11 that I cite in the text. Presumably calm testimony about false enthusiasm is more cred-
ible than enthusiastic testimony about true enthusiasm.
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and self-interest arose independently of the motives of other members of the
assembly. Enthusiasm typically was emulative, giving rise to comparison-based
interaction. As an interactive emotion, spite directly induced interaction.
The role of fear. As indicated above, the fear of the delegates might stem from
one of two sources. On the one hand, they might fear that unless they voted for and
adopted certain measures, the peasantry in the provinces might persist in their
destructive behavior. On the other hand, they might fear that unless they were seen
to vote for certain measures their physical safety might be in danger.
As in other cases (Elster 1999, p. 274), we must distinguish between pruden-
tial fear and visceral fear. The former is only a variety of self-interest, and will be
considered below. The latter, like other strong emotions, can undermine the ratio-
nal pursuit of self-interest, by inducing urgency (a preference for early action over
delayed action), impatience (a preference for early reward over delayed reward)
and biased beliefs (as the proverb has it: «We believe easily what we hope and
what we fear»)16. Although I have no way of proving it, my impression is that the
first and the third mechanism may have played a role. There is a sharp contrast
between the momentous stakes and the hurry with which the assembly dealt with
the problem. There may have been some opportunity costs of waiting, but this
degree of precipitation seems irrational. I return to some other aspects of this com-
plicated issue. Also, there seems to be some discrepancy between the actual and
the perceived extent of violence against persons in the peasant uprisings. The
proverbial wisdom just cited is amply confirmed by «the great fear» in the
provinces (Lefebvre 1988, pp. 72, 75, 96, 117-118, 176). The aristocratic belief in
a conspiracy to incite the peasant to burn the castles is similar in many respect
(ibid.. pp. 98, 161, 232).
The role of self-interest. The conventional wisdom is that the night of August
4 was a succession of self-sacrificial acts. It is natural to ask whether self-interest
may have been an obstacle to this trend. Rivarol (1824, p. 148) and Dumont
(1832, p. 103) report that Abbé Sieyes was widely accused of acting on self-inter-
est when he presented a sustained argument against the abolition of the tithe with-
out compensation. Even if, as they also state, his argument was valid17, that does
not exclude that he might have been swayed by self-interest in making it. Aboli-
tion with compensation or no abolition at all would certainly benefit the clergy in
general and Sieyes in particular (Bredin 1988, p. 58 n.). If the uncontested author-
ity of Lefebvre (1963, p. 151) accepts the self-interest charge, without citing his
reasons, it may be because of unsavory details from Sieyes’s past (Lavergne 1864,
p. 174 n.1). Sieyes, in turn, insinuates, without saying it in so many words, that the
uncompensated abolition of the tithe was motivated by the interest of the
landowning deputies, since it would cause the value of their land to go up (Cour-
rier de Provence XXVI p. 19 ff)18. The role of self-interest is also evident when
the secretary of the session, Fréteau, managed to suppress demands for the aboli-
tion of the parlements, of which he was a member (Kessel 1969, pp. 169-70).
16 See Elster (forthcoming) for a fuller discussion of these mechanisms.
17 Albert Soboul states in an editorial note to Jaurès (1968, p. 469) that the implementation of the
decree by the law of March 11 1791 confirms Sieyes’s claim.
18 See also note 13 above.
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Many participants and contemporary observers noted that the deputies were
most generous in sacrificing what they did not themselves possess. The Courrier
de Provence (XXIII p. 18) refers to «the hecatombs that mostly cost nothing to
those who proposed them». The Vicomte de Noailles demanded the abolition of
feudal rights, from which he derived no income, but not of the royal pensions,
which he depended on. The Marquis de Foucauld, who had no pension, proposed
that pensions be abolished. When the Bishop of Chartres proposed the abolition of
hunting rights, he was presumably not making a great personal sacrifice. Parish
priests who did not possess a single ecclesiastical «bénéfice» demanded that
nobody should have more than one (Ferrières 1880, p. 124). Some of these
demands were probably vindictive and are more fully discussed below.
Faced with insurrection, a rational agent may hesitate between repression and
concession. The problem is that each strategy can be counterproductive. Repres-
sion is subject to a paradox inherent in the «psychology of tyranny» (Roemer
1984): measures intended to stifle insurrection by inducing fear may provoke it by
inducing hatred. Concession is subject to the Tocquevillian paradox that measures
intended to satisfy popular demands may fuel them instead (Rivarol 1824, p. 152;
Dumont 1832, p. 104)19. Often, the best solution is to preempt the demands, by
conceding more than anyone had thought of asking for. What is often character-
ized as the «generosity» of the proposals and decrees of August 4 might be seen in
this perspective. The difficulty, as John Markoff (1996, p. 81) points out, is that
the generosity was too carefully hedged to be persuasive. «The rhetorical style of
sweeping and highly generalized renunciation followed by extensive qualification
and careful definition that wholly altered the commonsense meaning of the initial
generalization was an important noble contribution to a rhetorical style that blos-
somed in the revolutionary legislatures.» Adopting a serious preemptive strategy
would have demanded a degree of foresight in which the upper orders of 1789
were conspicuously lacking. The King, in particular, was constantly encouraged
to take the initiative and constantly failed to do so.
The role of enthusiasm. A pure desire to promote the public good does not,
despite many assertions to the contrary, seem to have been a common motivation
among the deputies. As emerges clearly from many of the characterizations cited
above under «Motives», they wanted to be seen as motivated to promote the pub-
lic good and, in particular, to be seen as no less motivated than their peers. Kessel
(1969, p. 247) also cites a contemporary document that refers to «the heat of the
moment that electrified each individual and made him fear being left behind» in
19 The claim that the decrees of August 4 only intensified the peasant attacks they were meant to
assuage is not confirmed by the statistical analysis in Markoff (1996) pp. 443, 461). His diagram on
p. 437 shows, however, that the troubles subsided before news about the decrees could have reached
the provinces. The relevant fact is nevertheless that they did not resume when the news did arrive. This
corresponds with the assessment by Kessel (1969, p. 237) that «the night of August 4 seems neither to
have halted nor worsened the disorders».
20 Although Hume (cited after Lovejoy 1961, p. 168) asserted that «To love the glory of virtuous
deeds is a sure proof of the love of virtue», I find it more plausible to say with Montaigne (1991,
p. 1157-1158) that «The more glittering the deed the more I subtract from its moral worth, because of
the suspicion aroused in me that it was exposed more for glitter than for goodness: goods displayed are
already halfway to being sold».
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the competition to appear generous20. Some sacrifices were certainly genuine, in
the sense of involving real losses. Parish priests who held several «bénéfices»
(ecclesiastical income) might sacrifice all but one (Duquesnoy, p. 267). A magis-
trate might propose justice to be rendered free of charge (ibid.). The deputies from
towns and provinces who gave up their privileges certainly had something to lose.
Another matter is whether they were genuine in the sense of being offered volun-
tarily. Buzot (AP 8, p. 354) said menacingly that «the clergy should at least appear
to make on its own initiative («de lui-même) all the sacrifices which the force of
circumstances would force it to make». After enactment of the decrees, a deputy
wrote to his constituents that he had sacrificed the privileges of his city because it
was going to happen anyway and it «would be very advantageous for you to be
cited among those who ceded voluntarily» (Kessel 1969, p. 246).
Earlier, I cited a description of the deputies who voted themselves ineligible to
the first ordinary legislature as «drunk with disinterestedness». Some motives
cited above suggest that we can impute a similar «noble intoxication» to (some of)
the deputies of August 421. While disinterested, the attitude is not dispassionate
and hence not impartial22. Given the strong passions involved, we might expect
deputies to appeal to the rules of order the assembly had just imposed on itself
(July 28) to prevent impulsive decisions (Casstaldo 1989, pp. 334-338). This
règlement contained two separate delay clauses. Art. IV.4 says that «No proposal
can be discussed on the day of the session in which it has been proposed, except if
the matter is urgent and the assembly decides that the proposal should be dis-
cussed immediately.» As acts of self-binding go, this is obviously not very con-
straining. An addition to Art. IV says that «Any proposal in legislative or consti-
tutional matters must be brought to discussion on three different days». Although
the provisions following this statement may suggest that it should not be read lit-
erally23, nobody in the debates over the decisions taken on the night of August 4
1789 seem to have adopted a non-literal interpretation. Some argued, disingenu-
ously, that the three-day requirement had in fact been fulfilled24; others that it
should be ignored (for reasons I shall spell out); but nobody that it didn’t exist. I
shall take it for granted, therefore, that the deputies believed the règlement to
require deliberations on three successive days.
21 In addition, it is likely that a good portion of them were drunk in the literal sense of the term
(Kessel 1969, pp. 192-195). Kessel (ibid, p. 193) cites an historian of the revolution who claimed that
a few days later, «to avoid nocturnal and intemperate deliberations, and the reproaches that good
Frenchmen who are not deputies could make to good patriots for deliberating upon coming from the
dinner table, it was decided that in future debates on important matters the assembly would be sober».
22 I am assuming here the classification of motives into interest, passion and reason (impartiality)
deployed by the French 17th century-moralists and further discussed in Elster (1999 a), Ch.V.
23 Castaldo, (1989), pp. 336-337 argues that it offers the assembly a choice between having three
discussions (first in plenary assembly, then in committees, and then again in the full assembly) or just
one (in case it decides against sending the proposal to the committees).
24 The controversial decisions by the assembly were taken on August 4, in clear violation of the
three-day requirement. When the assembly over the next several days proceeded to fine-tuning the
decisions and some objected that they been adopted illegally, the noble deputies Mortemart (Point du
Jour, vol.2, p. 55) and Montmorency (Kessel 1969, p. 201) responded that since three days had passed
the requirement was satisfied.
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Almost from the beginning, and certainly on August 4, the assembly ignored
this decision to bind itself. In a letter to his constituency, the Comte d’Antraigues
complains that in order to «engage the [...] assembly to consent to all the decrees
of August 4 one had to [...] destroy the wisest rules of the assembly itself, which
put a brake on hasty deliberations», and the Comte de Roys wrote to his con-
stituency in similar terms (Kessel 1969, pp. 127, 200). Having tried to stem the
tide on August 4 (expect for his own proposal to abolish pensions), the Marquis de
Foucauld also referred to the violation of the rules in a speech on August 6 (ibid.,
p. 200). In response, those who wanted immediate action said that «an élan of
patriotism does not need three days» and «since one cannot vary in such senti-
ments, the three days would be a pointless waste of time» (Beaume and Liancourt,
cited in the Courrier de Provence XXIV, p. 11). The first part of the latter claim is,
of course, nonsense, yet reflects the psychological fact that when in the grip of
strong emotions it is often difficult to envisage that they will come to an end (Ch.1
above).
One might explain the assembly’s violation of its self-imposed constraint by
the fact that there was nobody to hold it to its prior decision. In Bentham’s Politi-
cal Tactics, it is argued that in a unicameral assembly precommitment tactics are
unlikely to work. Among the advantages of bicameralism, the work cites that of
«Maturity of discussion»:
This division is a certain method of preventing precipitation and surprise.
It is true, that in a single assembly, rules may be established which prescribe multiplied
examinations, according to the importance of the business; and it is thus that we find in
the House of Commons three readings, three discussions, at different intervals. [...] It is
by these general precautions, and others like them, that the danger of surprise is obviated,
and maturity of deliberation secured.
This is true: but a single assembly may have the best rules, and disregard them when it
pleases. Experience proves that it is easy to set them aside; and urgency of circumstances
always furnish a ready pretext, and a popular pretext, for doing what the dominant party
desires. If there are two assemblies, the forms will be observed; because if one violate
them, it affords a legitimate reason to the other for rejection of everything presented to it
after such suspicious innovation25.
Alternatively, one might offer an account that both explains and justifies the
behavior. Addressing the regular tendency of the assembly to ignore the delay
constraint, several writers justify it by the urgent imperatives of revolution
(Aulard 1882, p. 34; Brasart 1989, p. 44). In the present case, however, this argu-
ment does not seem very plausible. The urgency, while perceived, was not real; it
was in fact the very kind of spurious urgency the delay constraint was supposed to
protect them against.
Another justification may hold out more promise, if we turn a standard argument
for constitutionalism on its head. According to that argument, constitutions are ties
25 Bentham (1999) p. 26. This passage was inserted by Etienne Dumont. According to a later let-
ter from Dumont to Bentham, the latter’s original text did not favor bicameralism (ibid., p. 25, n.1); in
fact Bentham thought bicameralism «needless, useless, worse than useless» (cited after Mueller1996,
p. 205).
26 On September 4, he had already argued that the «three-headed hydra» to be created by the con-
stitution (lower house, upper house, and the King) could not itself create a constitution (AP 8, p. 574).
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that Peter when sober imposes on himself to restrain Peter when drunk (Elster 2000,
Ch.II). Reversing that argument, Clermont-Tonnerre (AP 9, p. 461) said on October
19 that «anarchy is a terrifying but necessary passage, and the only moment in which
one can establish a new order. It is not in times of calm that one can take uniform
measures»26. Passion is necessary, one might argue, to make people ignore the petty
interests that will otherwise be an obstacle to radical change27. It follows that indi-
viduals may want to act quickly if they can predict that a delay will replace passion
with the calmness of interest rather than the calmness of reason.
Let me cite some statements that can be interpreted as responses to the antici-
pation of decay of emotion28. The Duc de Mortemart said that «there was only one
desire on the part of the nobility, which was to hasten the decree which would con-
summate all these desire» (Bailly 1804, p. 20). Baron Custine said that «I am
against all the delays («lenteurs») that a belated repentance might bring to the
most noble disinterestedness» (AP 8, p. 354). In this perspective one may also
offer a comment on a statement by Kessel (1969, p. 188), that «the haste with
which the patriotic deputies wrote to their provinces» to inform them about the
decrees may have been «aimed at preventing the privileged from going back on
the decrees». Given that almost all the deputies had something to lose from the
decrees, perhaps some patriots also wanted to prevent themselves from reneging?
These are speculative interpretations, but they do not seem utterly implausible29.
The role of spite. I shall treat spite and vindictiveness together, although they
are somewhat different emotions. Spite is hostility based on long-standing ani-
mosity towards another agent or group. Vindictiveness is hostility based on a
recent action by that agent or group. On the night of August 4, these emotions had,
by all accounts, a powerful influence, as will be shown by some examples.
I mentioned earlier Foucauld’s proposal to abolish pensions. The explanation may be not
merely that he had no pension to lose, but that [i] as a member of the provincial nobility
27 Rudenfeld (2001) is a sustained argument to this effect. He recognizes, as I do (Elster 2000, pp.
159, 173), that constitutions may be written when Peter when drunk. He also argues that this is in gen-
eral a desirable property of constituent assemblies. With regard to societies as deeply divided as France
in 1789, he may well be right; see the passage from Clermont-Tonnerre quoted in the text.
28 Note, however, that this idea is inconsistent with the «hot-to-cold empathy gap» proposed by
Loewenstein (1996) and invoked in the text above. On balance, I think people usually find it hard to
imagine that their current strong emotion will not last indefinitely, but there are counterexamples
(Elster 2000, p. 23).
29 A related justification for ignoring the delay constraint stems from the fact that delays allow for
behind-the-scenes intrigues and deals that cannot take place in the full glare of the public (Elster 2000,
p. 125). Although I cannot cite evidence that this argument was offered on August 4, it was deployed on
another great occasion in the Constituent Assembly. On November 6, the assembly debated Mirabeau’s
proposal that deputies could be chosen as ministers, the implicit issue being whether Mirabeau himself
would be allowed to accede to this function. The assembly seemed favorable, but some deputies asked
for a postponement. Le Chapelier, who had «recently come to believe that sagacity was needed to cre-
ate durable laws, feared that if the vote was postponed to the next day the night would favor the
intrigues, and asked that the delay be rejected» (Groz 1860, vol.III, p. 55). He failed, and the next day,
when the intrigues had done their work, the motion was defeated (Gooch 1960, pp. 117-118).
30 Ferrières (1880), p. 124 and Bailly (1804, p. 19) claims that these «cross-sacrifices» occurred
in the opposite order, which casts some doubts on this often-told anecdote. Pinsseau (1941, p. 74 con-
firms Droz by asserting that the Comte de Virieu (whom he must have confused with the Duc du
Châtelet) proposed the abolition of the tithe «in retaliation» for the abolition of hunting rights.
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he felt strong animosity towards the court nobility and the «monstrous gifts» they
received from the King (Michelet 1952, p. 213).
[ii] After the bishop of Chartres had proposed the abolition of exclusive hunting rights,
the Duc du Châtelet said to his neighbors, «Ah! he takes our hunting, I’ll take his tithe»,
and proposed that the tithe be abolished with compensation (Droz 1860, vol.II, p. 308)30.
[iii] Cottin, a secretary in the parlements, demands the abolition of seigniorial justice,
whereupon Richier, a noble, demands the administration of the justice of the parlements
free of charge (AP 8, p. 346). That the latter proposal was meant as a retaliation is made
likely by the ironic introduction in which he refers to «the relief the people can expect
from the extinction of seigniorial justice».
Mirabeau’s younger brother, the Vicomte de Mirabeau, gave up his war pension, asking
others to follow suit. This may have been [iv] to bring the Vicomte de Noailles down with
him (Duquesnoy p. 279) or [v] to take revenge on the Lameth brothers, whose mother
had received a substantial gift from the king (Moniteur p. 318).
Rivarol (1824, pp. 141-142) writes that «[vi] younger brothers from good families, who
possess nothing, were delighted to sacrifice their fortunate elders on the altar of the coun-
try, and [vii] some parish priests enjoyed the equally voluptuous pleasure of renouncing
the bénéfices of others».
Duquesnoy (1894, p. 285) writes that [viii] «it was vengeance that led [the nobility] to go
after the venality of office».
[ix] Ferrières (1880, p. 125-126) describes how «a large number of voices called out that
as individuals had given up their rights and their privileges, it was only just that the
provinces and towns equally give up the privileges and rights that weigh on most of the
kingdom and creates a shocking disproportion in the distribution of taxes», as if the abo-
lition of one injustice could be justified only by the previous abolition of another.
Even though this or that claim may be attributed to the bitterness of defeated
nobles, the cumulative impact of the examples makes them hard to ignore. The
more general characterizations are so concordant that it is equally difficult to write
them off. Dumont (1832, pp.101-102) describes how «Those who felt themselves
ruined by a decree that had just been adopted by unanimity proposed another so
that they would not be the only ones to suffer». Ferrières (1880, p. 126) describes
the process in terms of dueling: «each party wants to touch («atteindre») its adver-
sary, to aim a blow at him, without worrying about those he receives by exposing
himself». The Courrier de Provence (XXIV, p. 3) writes that «it seems as if one
put up for auction all the old effects, the old powdery feudal titles, and the price
asked for the destruction of one was the destruction of another». Of these writers,
only Ferrières had an ax to grind. Hence I think Kessel (1969 p. 158) is justified
in asserting that «those who had grounds for complaints were mostly concerned
with not being privileged, [that is], privileged in misfortune. Hence those who
were the most crushed by what was happening, and guided by a feeling of the
injustice that bore down on them, took the others with them in a forced equality».
The outcome. The result of this process, in which particular interest and emo-
tions of fear or spite mingled with genuine or feigned enthusiasm, was to realize
the general interest. Following Marx (1967, p. 657), one might cite an English
proverb, «When thieves fall out, honest men come into their own.» The Courrier
de Provence (XXIV, p. 3) writes that «although one might proceeded with more
method, the results would not have been more advantageous. The kind of mutual
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challenge of the different orders [...] turned entirely to the general good’. Duques-
noy (1894, p. 285) writes that since it was fear that made the nobility to give up his
feudal rights and vindictiveness that made them attack venality of office, «it is
clear that fear and vengeance made the public good». Clermont-Tonnerre was
probably right when he claimed that such «uniform measures» could not have
been brought about in any other manner.
As noted above, the outcome was cemented, perhaps deliberately, by the haste
with which the deputies informed their constituencies. Once the news had been
diffused, there was no going back. On September 18 Duquesnoy (1894, p. 349)
cites a Germanicism by the Alsacian deputy Rewbell: «the people are penetrated
by the benefits they have been promised; they will not let themselves be depene-
trated». In a letter to the deputy Faulcon of September 22, we read that «Landown-
ers, to whatever order they might belong, probably regret the sacrifices they made
in a moment of delirium; but how can one go back on gains that were announced
with such blameable haste?» (Kessel 1969, p. 381 n. 940). Later, the assembly
tried to sabotage its own decrees by the legislation enacted in March and May
1790 (Markoff 1996, pp. 460-462). After many twists and turns, all feudal rights
were abolished without compensation on July 17 1793.
VIII. CONCLUSION:
EMOTIONS AND COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
The most salient aspect of the interactions I have discussed is probably the role
of emotion. Visceral fear, vanity, enthusiasm, spite and vindictiveness all con-
tributed to the unanimous vote on August 4. Without claiming that the situation
was unique in that respect, I believe it was unusual.
Emotion and social interaction have been studied under the heading of emo-
tional contagion. Hatfield, Cacioppa and Rapson (1994) argue that emotional
contagion is based on (i) unconscious mimicry of the emotional expression (e.g.
smiles) of others and (ii) feedback from the expressions that are mimicked to the
emotions themselves. This mechanism does not rely on any cognitive mechanism
for mediating between the emotions of different individuals. Although the authors
(ibid., pp.124-125) cite the Great Fear of 1789 as an example, they provide no evi-
dence that it conforms to this model. In fact, as I have argued, cognitive distortions
probably played a key role in the Great Fear.
Social interaction and collective decision-making have been studied from
many perspectives, some of them mentioned in Section II. Unless people are
bound by imperative mandates, the votes they cast can be influenced by discus-
sion, by observation of how others are voting, by vote-trading, or by strategic con-
siderations such as the desire to avoid «wasting one’s vote». In the last case, what
shapes the individual’s vote is not the actual behavior of others, but anticipation of
their behavior, which may in turn be based on their anticipation of his, etc. One
might perhaps refer to such behavior as virtual interaction, to distinguish it from
genuine causal interaction.
Emotion and decision-making have been extensively studied, but mainly at the
individual level. Although emotion can under some conditions improve the qual-
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ity of individual decisions (Isen 1993), it is more likely to have a negative impact,
either by clouding thought, biasing it, or induce suboptimal investment in infor-
mation-gathering (Elster forthcoming). In group decisions, the outcome may be
affected by prior emotional bonds between members of the group (Sunstein 2000,
pp. 91-92). Also, as illustrated by the role of the fear of peasant uprisings in the
Constituent Assembly, emotion may serve as a common cause that shapes deci-
sion-making by affecting each member separately. The emotion was shaped by
interaction, but not among the members.
The case study I have presented involves all three factors: emotion, decision-
making, and social interaction among the decision-makers. It may usefully be
linked to experimental work on jury deliberation (Sunstein et al. 2002), which
found that discussion tends to produce more extreme outcomes, compared to the
average outcome of individual decisions, because of a «rhetorical asymmetry»
that gives an advantage to extreme positions. The story of August 4 1789 is cer-
tainly one of going to extremes. It is hard to tell, however, whether the behavior
was due to the fear of being (seen as) sacrificing less than others, to the vainglori-
ous desire of being (seen as) sacrificing more, or to genuine enthusiasm.
Columbia University, New York
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